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Abstract
We study the evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma on two social networks obtained from actual
relational data. We find very different cooperation levels on each of them that can not be
easily understood in terms of global statistical properties of both networks. We propose
to look instead at the mesoscopic scale, specifically to the community structure of the net-
works, and show that the reason for this different cooperation behavior can be traced back
to their intermediate-scale features. We explain the dependence of the cooperation level on
the temptation parameter in terms of the internal structure of the communities and their in-
terconnections. Our results support the conclusion that studies of games on model networks
and their interpretation in terms of global properties may not be sufficient to study specific,
real social systems. In addition, the community perspective may be helpful to interpret the




The emergence and survival of cooperation in adverse environments has been, for a
long time, a challenging problem for scholars in disciplines as diverse as biology, sociology
or economics [1, 2, 3]. While some answers have been advanced in the last forty years,
including kin selection [4], reciprocity [5], repeated interactions [6], or indirect reciprocity
[7], cooperation among unrelated individuals is far from understood. Social dilemmas,
situations in which individual rationality leads to situations in which everyone is worse
off, are a prominent example of this conundrum [8]. Within the general framework of
evolutionary game theory, which is particularly well suited to study this problem, the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a paradigmatic setting to capture the paradox of altruism
persistence against short-term benefits of egoism. In this game two players choose between
cooperation (C) or defection (D). If they both cooperate or defect they receive a payoff of
magnitude R (for reward) or P (for punishment) respectively; if one of them chooses C and
the other decides D, the latter obtains a payoff T (for temptation) and the former ends
up with the sucker’s payoff S. Relations between different possible payoffs follow the rule:
2R > T > R > P > S, that immediately poses the dilemma: While the rational choice
is to defect, it leads to a highly inefficient outcome as compared to that obtained by two
cooperators.
Among the plethora of studies devoted to this issue, a particularly important and
fruitful one is the modeling of the population as a set of non-rational, learning agents that
interact locally [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. Locality is introduced in the model through a
regular lattice in which agents are placed. These agents then play the game only with their
neighbors (in neighborhoods that can be defined in different ways) instead of interacting
with all other agents. Learning is introduced through imitation: after a round of games
has been carried through the whole lattice, agents look at their neighbors and choose the
strategy that has led to the highest payoff before proceeding to the next round of games.
With these two ingredients, namely locality and imitation, it is generally observed that
states in which a sizeable part of the population cooperates emerge (at least for values of T
not too close to 2R), the mechanism for this emergence being the formation of clusters of
cooperators that can successfully outcompete defectors.
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In view of this conclusion, valid for the PD on regular lattices, the question arises as to
whether the result applies also to social networks. As a first step to answer this question,
some authors have focused their interest on the influence of certain structural features
that have been observed in real networks on the evolution of cooperation [17, 18, 19].
Thus, Abramson and Kuperman [17] studied the small-world phenomenon [20], finding a
non-monotonic dependence of the density of cooperators on the number of long-range links
and on T , while Dura´n and Mulet [18] analyzed Poisson random graphs, and concluded
that in this case the asymptotic state was non-stationary. More recently, Santos and
coworkers [19] considered scale-free networks as models for social networks, and observed a
region of parameters for the PD where cooperation was the asymptotic state. A general
conclusion of this research is that the inhomogeneity of the degree distribution plays a
central role on this issue, and that it may favor the emergence of cooperation. However,
none of these studies deals with true social networks, as they are all based on different
types of artificial models (small-world, Poisson random, scale-free). It is only natural then
to ask about the emergence and survival of cooperation in social networks obtained directly
from experiments or measurements [21].
To our knowledge, there is only one paper about the PD on real social networks [22],
in which the dynamics of cooperation driven by random mutations is studied, motivating
further claims of the relevance of the inhomogeneous degree distribution and of the links
between hubs or highly connected sites. However, as the point of view in [22] is dynamical,
and the learning rule is not unconditional imitation, it is not possible to make a direct
comparison to earlier works. Therefore, our research is a first attempt to understand the
relevance of introducing empirical social networks as a support for the local interactions
in the framework of imitation models [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. There are a number of
reasons to stick to this learning rule. From the theoretical viewpoint, it is clear that other
rules, such as best-reply, will lead straightforwardly to a fully defecting population even
with local interactions. It can be argued that imitation is too simple a rule but, as discussed
in [13], there are several reasons why agents may fail to recognize they are in a dilemma
situation, which would lead them to defection. In addition, for global interactions learning
by imitation ends up in global defection, and hence cooperation in a local model can not be
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due solely to this learning rule. From the experimental viewpoint, there are several reports
that indicate that imitation is commonly used by humans [23, 24, 25]. Finally, imitation
can be justified in psychological terms by looking at how confirmation and disconfirmation
of beliefs are carried out [26] and has been also proposed as a relevant force to drive the
evolution towards economic equilibrium [27].
Into this well established and accepted scenario of local interactions and learning by
imitation, we bring in a mesoscopic perspective, by focusing on the community structure of
the social network. This is one of the most relevant characteristics of real social networks
and, as we will see below, it gives rise to very important differences in behavior: Indeed,
the main result of our research is that cooperation may or may not emerge in a true
social network depending on the structure of its communities. After providing evidence
supporting this conclusion, we will identify the specific mesoscopic structural properties
responsible for these opposite behaviors, namely the intra- and inter-community structures.
Our results make clear that in order to understand cooperation in social networks a detailed
analysis of these mesoscopic features is needed, and that a generic, separate study of the
influence of specific structural characteristics (such as a scale free degree distribution or
the small-world property) may not apply to actual sociological issues. We will also discuss
how the observed behaviors are connected to the design or origin of the networks considered.
II. METHODS
A. Datasets
For our research we have used two social substrates obtained by sampling real relational
data. The first substrate is a social network obtained from the email traffic between
members of University Rovira i Virgili (in Tarragona, Spain; email network from now
on), where nodes represent individual email addresses and undirected links between two
nodes indicate bidirectional communication (at least one email in each direction) [28]. Our
second real social substrate nodes represent users of the ”Pretty-Good-Privacy” encryption
algorithm (PGP network, from now on), and links trace trust relationships between those
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network ref. N P(k) < C > r
email [28] 1133 ∼ exp−k/9.2 0.25 0.078
PGP [29] 10680 ∼


k−2.63 if k < 40
k−4.0 if k > 40
0.26 0.238
TABLE I: Statistical properties of e-mail and PGP networks. N is the number of nodes of the giant
component of the network considering only those links that are bidirectional (indicating mutual
acquaintance between nodes). P(k) is the degree distribution (best fit to the data). < C > is the
clustering coefficient, and finally r stands for the assortativity coefficient [30].
persons who sign each other’s public keys [29]. For a comparison of some statistical
properties see Table 1. Note that neither of these social networks is bipartite, in contrast
with many other social networks in the literature that are build on a collaboration framework.
B. Communities
As the key concept to understand networks at a mesoscopic level, we propose to focus on
their community structure. Community structure is a common feature of many networks:
Communities arise as subgraphs with dense connection within themselves and sparser
ones between them, and very generally have functional implications [31]. Among the wide
variety of algorithms available to define the community distribution of networks [32], we
have chosen a divisive algorithm based on Extremal Optimization (EO) heuristics [33].
A detailed description of the method is beyond the scope of the paper, but full details
can be found elsewhere [34]. Once we have determined the number and size of networks
communities, we focus on the study of two structural mesoscopic characteristics: The
connectivity between communities and their internal organization.
C. Randomization
In order to understand the effects of the community structure, we have compared the
results on the two networks with their randomized version preserving the degree of each
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FIG. 1: Randomization of networks. One step of the rewiring procedure: On the left we can see,
in black and grey respectively, the two nodes chosen randomly and the neighbors to be exchanged.
On the right, after making the rewiring, the original links have disappeared and the new ones are
represented as dashed lines.
node, carried out through a rewiring process [35] (see Fig.1). The process, that consists
of choosing randomly two nodes and exchanging one neighbor of each node (also selected
randomly), destroys correlations between nodes and in particular the community structure.
The comparison should reveal the effects introduced on the PD game by the community
distribution, separating them from those ones generated by the degree distribution (for this
topic see e.g. [19, 36] and references therein).
D. Dynamics
Our simulations of the PD over all the networks follow strictly the rules in [10, 12],
namely:
• Initial strategies of agents are assigned randomly with the same probability to be C or
D (we have checked that other choices for the initial fraction of C or D lead to similar
results).
• The game is played between each pair of neighbors. Payoffs are R = 1, T = b (b > 1),
S = P = 0, b being our control parameter.
• Accumulated payoffs of all agents are computed by adding up the results of the games
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with their neighbors in the present turn.
• In the next round, every agent imitates the strategy of the most successful agent in
her neighborhood (randomly selected if there are two or more agents with the same
payoff), after which payoffs are reset to zero.
III. RESULTS
Let us begin by examining the results of simulations of the PD on real social networks as
a function of the temptation parameter b. In Fig. 2 we plot the final density of cooperators
on the two cases addressed here, email and PGP. The first remarkable feature of these plots
is the high level of cooperation attained even for large values of b on both networks, as
compared to the results on regular lattices [10, 12, 16] with the same imitation dynamics.
The cooperation levels are not as high as those reported by Santos et al. [36, 37] on
scale free networks, although in their simulations the dynamics is stochastic, and therefore
a direct comparison can not be made. In this regard we want to stress that the two
networks we are analyzing can not be considered scale-free: The e-mail network has a
clear exponential distribution of degrees, and the PGP presents two regions with a clear
crossover from a power law behavior with exponents −2.63 (for degree k < 40) and −4 (for
degree k > 40) indicating clearly a bounded degree distribution.
Figure 2 allows also to extract another very relevant observation: The dependence of
the level of cooperation on the temptation parameter b is very different for both networks.
As we may see from the plots, the cooperation level on the email network is a decreasing
function of b, going from values very close to unanymous cooperation for b >
∼
1 to about
a 15% for b close to 2. On the contrary, the PGP network presents an almost constant
cooperation level, with a variation of a 10% at most in all the range of b values, except for
b = 2. These results inmediately lead to the conclusion that there is no typical behavior
of the cooperation level on true social networks, at least in the framework of the PD with
imitation dynamics or learning.
The above conclusion is further reinforced by noting that the cooperation level in each
network changes in a very different manner when their community structure is taken away.
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FIG. 2: Evolution of cooperation in real social networks. Black lines: Density of cooperators
as a function of b, obtained by numerical simulations on the email (top) and PGP (bottom)
networks. Red lines: Density of cooperators on random networks generated from the original
ones by a rewiring procedure that preserves the degree distribution, but breaks up the community
structure (see text). The equilibrium densities of cooperators have been obtained by averaging 500
generations, after a transient time of 750 generation steps. Each point corresponds to an average
over 1000 independent simulations with 50% cooperators and defectors as the initial condition.
Indeed, if we compare the results of playing the game on each lattice with those obtained
in their randomized version, generated as described above, we observe opposite behaviors.
On one hand, on the email network cooperation reaches extremal values, higher than the
random case when b is close to 1, and lower when b is close to its maximum limit of 2.
On the other hand, the PGP network exhibits exactly the opposite behavior: Cooperation
is better on the random version for low values of the temptation b, and worse for higher
values. Remarkably, the cooperation level in the random versions of the two networks
is very similar, and close to those reported in [18] for Poisson graphs and in [37] for the
configuration (random) model, although it must be kept in mind that the dynamics is
different in the latter case; interestingly, this does not seem to induce large differences in
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behavior in this respect.
Our two examples, email and PGP, do not seem to fit in any of the categories previously
reported in the literature for the behavior of the PD, which implies that the macroscopic
(global, statistical) differences between both topologies (see Table 1) are not determinant
for the opposite behaviors observed. Furthermore, the fact that destroying the correlations,
in particular their community structure, preserving the degree distribution, drives the
behavior of the two networks to the same general pattern, points directly to the mesoscopic
organizational level as the possible source of the explanation for the dramatic differences
observed in the original systems. Therefore, in order to gain insight on this problem, we
have to make a deeper analysis of the structure of both networks, an analysis that must
proceed at an intermediate level in view of the fact that neither the whole network nor
individual agents provide the clue to understanding our observations.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Inter-community structure
To summarize the results obtained from a community analysis of both social networks
and to facilitate their comparison, the outcome of our analysis is jointly presented in
Fig. 3. Each node corresponds to a community, and a link between two nodes denotes
cross-relations. In addition, size of nodes and links give information about community size
and number of cross-links, respectively. It is evident from the plot that communities in the
email network are densely interconnected, organized almost as a fully connected graph with
almost constant weighted degree distribution. On the contrary, the community network
corresponding to PGP presents a sparser pattern of links satisfying an exponential form for
the weighted degree distribution.
How can differences in connectivity between communities result in the behaviors shown
in the previous section? To answer this question, consider an isolated community, which
we could see as a small separate network, and where the PD game evolves in principle
9
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FIG. 3: Top: Community structures of the email (left) and PGP (right) networks. Nodes corre-
spond to communities (where size is proportional to their number of members) and links represent
cross-connections (where width corresponds to the number of inter-connetions). Bottom: Weighted
degree distribution of the two community networks above.
to a steady state that depends mainly on local conditions (initial densities of C and D
and structure) and on b. Imagine now that the links with the rest of the network are
progressively brought into the picture: The local dependence is in turn influenced by a
macroscopic scale dependence. As cross-connection progresses, the dynamics of the game
inside the community becomes more and more vulnerable to external (i.e., from outside
the community) influences such as, e.g., global cooperator hubs (when temptation to
defect, b, is low) or defection avalanches (as the b parameter grows). This rationale implies
immediately that from the observed community structure, the cooperation level should be
less dependent on the temptation parameter on the PGP network, where communities are
less interconnected, than on the email network, in agreement with the results above.
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B. Intra-community structure
The internal structure of communities in both networks also presents differences that
can be related to the results obtained. To reveal this influence, we have studied the internal
(i.e., within the community) degree distribution of communities on the attained cooperation
level. To represent the results for all communities in a way that allows comparison in
a direct manner, we have calculated the normalized difference between the average and
the maximum value of the internal degree in each community. Figure 4 shows the results
obtained: Comparing both diagrams, we notice that the internal degree of communities
forming the email network is quite homogeneous, while the case of PGP communities
presents (in most cases) maximum internal degrees that stand out significantly from the
average value (up to 30 times the average degree), implying a very large heterogeneity. We
have called these nodes with very high internal degree local hubs.
Previous works have stressed the role of hubs at a macroscopical level in PD dynamics
on adaptive networks [38, 39, 40]. Although our networks are static, it is expected
that the presence of these local hubs in PGP communities (as well as their absence in
the email ones) influences strongly the evolution of the PD on these networks. To be
specific, local hubs play a double stabilizing role: First, as most nodes in the commu-
nity are directly linked to their local hub, the whole community tends to imitate the
strategy of the hub; second, when a less connected member of the community changes
her strategy following an external node, the influence of the local hub makes it harder
for this strategy to spread to the whole community. On the contrary, homogeneous
internal degree distributions, as in the case of the email network, lead to a behavior that
is not governed by hubs: All nodes are more or less equivalent, and subsequently their
strategies evolve in a synchronized manner, at least to some degree. That this is indeed
the case is shown in the example of Fig. 5, where we can clearly observe some communi-
ties (marked in red) changing strategy from one step to the next almost as a coherent group.
In fact, these oscillations provide yet another manner to characterize the difference be-
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FIG. 4: Internal structure of the communities and presence of ’local hubs’. Normalized difference
between the average and the maximum value of the internal degree in each community. Large
differences at many PGP communities indicate the presence of hubs at a local (community) scale.
On the contrary, differences corresponding to email communities are small, revealing quite homo-
geneous distributions of degrees.
tween the two networks of our study: We can also monitor the proportion of unsatisfied
agents, where an unsatisfied agent is defined as an agent that switches strategy cyclically
over time. The results for both networks are shown in Fig. 6. We see that for both networks
the number of unsatisfied agents grows with the temptation parameter. We note in passing
that the density of unsatisfied agents in the randomized networks (not shown), consistently
with the results in [18] for Poisson graphs, is appreciably larger than in the original ones,
indicating once again that the community structure plays a key role in this problem. For
the email network the average density per community of unsatisfied agents behaves like the
fraction of unsatisfied agents, but for the PGP network there is a peak at b = 1.3 and sub-
squently decreases with increasing b. We have checked that this behavior is due to a specific
community, which oscillates with a larger amplitude than the rest. As b increases, more
communities begin to oscillate and the effect of this particular one is averaged out. On the
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FIG. 5: Synchronized behavior of communities. From a) to d), four consecutive steps of the
temporal evolution of a simulation on a community-based representation of the network. White
and black nodes represent agents adopting C and D respectively. Regions marked in red correspond
to communities that change of strategy quasi-coherently in each time step. See [28] for more
information about this type of network representation.
other hand, and in agreement with our expectations based on the discussion in this section,
the behavior of PGP communities is much more static because local hubs act as controllers
of the community (and hence as inhibitors of the oscillations), as clearly shown in Fig. 7.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have addressed the issue of the emergence of cooperation on true social
networks in the framework of the evolutionary PD with imitation. Our results on two
different networks show clearly that the specific details of the network considered are very
relevant to determine the level of cooperation reached. Furthermore, our analysis sheds
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FIG. 6: Unsatisfied agents and communities. Black lines: Fraction of communities where there
are unsatisfied agents. Red lines: Average density of unsatified agents (average is carried out only
over communities with unsatisfied agents). Top: Email network; bottom: PGP network.
light on the role played by community structure in promoting or inhibiting cooperation in
social networks: Our results strongly suggest that two mesoscopic structural properties (the
connectivity between communities and their internal structure) influence the evolution of
cooperation in social networks by increasing or lowering the stability of the behavior of the
communities against changes on the temptation to defect. Thus, on one hand, the email
network presents a dense connectivity between communities and quite homogeneous degree
distributions within communities. The interplay of these two properties imposes a high
sensitivity of cooperation to changes on the b value, that manifests itself in the coherent
behavior of communities. On the other hand, the PGP network exhibits very different
characteristics at a mesoscopic level, namely sparse connectivity between communities and
presence of local hubs. These are both stabilizing properties that contribute to a scenario
with high stability against defection and a cooperation level almost independent of the
temptation parameter. Interestingly, recent work [41] on artificial networks, studying the
PD Erdo¨s-Re´nyi and Baraba´si-Albert models finds also different levels of cooperation
on both systems that resemble our observations here (the properties of the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
and Baraba´si-Albert models are similar, respectively, to our email and PGP networks),
and advance an explanation in terms of hubs much as we do here, although from a more
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FIG. 7: Hubs control the behavior of PGP communities. From a) to d), four consecutive steps
of the temporal evolution of a simulation within a PGP community. White and black vertices
correspond to cooperators and defectors, respectively. Smaller vertices and dashed lines represent
external nodes and links with other communities. Notice the role of the central hub (marked in red),
stabilizing cooperative behavior of the community in two ways: Preventing external defection from
entering the community (directly through its external neighbors), and keeping internal defection
under control in peripherial locations.
microscopic viewpoint.
From an evolutionary perspective, the work by Egu´ıluz et al. [38] indicates that if
the network is allowed to co-evolve with the strategies, a network with hubs develops.
Interestingly, in this network with hubs, the cooperation level shows similar dependence on
the temptation parameter, much as we have found here. Along similar lines, recent work
by Santos et al. [40, 42] suggests a connection between the emergence of cooperation and
the evolutionary appearance of degree heterogeneity. In this context, our study, which we
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stress is carried out on static networks, suggests that the cooperation levels we observe in
the PD may be related to the different origin of the two networks: While the PGP network
is spontaneously formed and with a clearly cooperative goal in mind (namely, finding help
to ensure communication privacy), the email network arises from an underlying external
structure, whose main purpose is not so clearly cooperative as it involves many other
aspects and tasks. Our results would then support the existence of community structures
organized around hubs with resilient cooperative behavior.
The above comment suggests, in addition, that our results may be of interest for the
design of hierarchies and organizations with tailored cooperation behavior. We have
seen that the email network reaches, for moderate values of the temptation parameter,
cooperation levels very close to the optimum. Therefore, networks with this structure
should be used in order to achieve very high performance levels in terms of cooperation. On
the other hand, while the email network is quite susceptible to an increase of the temptation
parameter, and hence exhibits a degrading of the cooperation for large temptations, the
PGP network, with its weakly connected communities with hubs, is much more robust in
this respect, and ensures cooperation for almost any temptation. Organizations with a
PGP-like structure would exhibit a very robust cooperation, although there would always
be defectors. Further research at the mesoscopic scale, looking at different combinations
of the inter- and intra-community structures, could lead to designs that would be both
optimum and robust. On the other hand, the coherent oscillation behavior observed in the
email network may be used jointly with other synchronization schemes recently proposed
[43] for community detection and analysis.
Finally, we want to emphasize our main conclusion, namely that cooperation in real
social networks is a complex issue depending on the combination of the effects of several
structural features. This result has far-reaching implications: Thus, several previous
researches have considered how cooperation emerges in the PD on different model networks,
including gaussian, scale free and small world ones as paradigms of social networks. There
are two main differences between our work and those previous ones: first, the cooperation
level is in general higher that in the model networks, and second, that results are very
different for similar global parameters of the network due to the influence of the community
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structure, often undetected by global measurements. It is then clear that any approximation
to the evolution of cooperation in social networks based on the generalization of only one
of these structural features is far too simplistic and may be misleading. We envisage that
similar conclusions may apply to other models of cooperation or coordination based on
other games, as arguments based on the inter- and intra-structure of the communities may
well carry over to them. In any event, we believe that subsequent studies on these issues
should then be carried out on a case by case basis, and should involve a careful analysis at
a mesoscopic (community) level, trying to find out whether behaviors can be predicted or
classified in classes attending to this structure.
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